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Unions, Wages, and Skills

Barry T. Hirsch
Edward J. Schumacher

ABSTRACT

Studies uniformly conclude that union wage effects are largest for work
ers with low measured skills. Longitudinal analysis using 19891901994195 Current Population Survey matched panels produces union pre
mium estimates equivalent across skill groups, following appropriate sam
ple restrictions and control for worker-specific skills. Evidence from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth on aptitude scores confirms that
union workers with high measured skills have relatively low unmeasured
skills. Differential selection by skill class and skill homogeneity in union
workplaces results from employer and employee sorting in response to
wage standardization, union organizing where skills are homogeneous,
and unionized employers' reluctance to hire the most as well as least able
workers.

I. Introduction

The relationship between unionism, wages, and worker skills has
been the focus of considerable research. A universal finding is that union-nonunion
wage differentials are larger for lower-skilled than for higher-skilled workers.1 The
standard explanation for this result is that unions standardize wages by decreasing
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I. See, for example, Johnson and Youmans (1971) and Ashenfelter (1978). Lewis provides a survey,
concluding that union wage gaps decrease with occupational skill level and schooling (Lewis 1986, pp.
128-31, 136-39). As discussed subsequently, Card (1996) arrives at a similar conclusion using longitudinal
analysis.
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differentials across and within job positions (Freeman 1980) so that lower-skilled
workers receive a larger premium relative to their alternative nonunion wage. There
exists a related literature on omitted ability bias and the estimation of union wage
effects. The conventional argument is that a wage premium encourages skill upgrad
ing by unionized employers, so that standard OLS estimates of the premium are
biased upward owing to a failure to account fully for worker skills positively corre
lated with union status.
In this paper, we argue that union wage effects need not lead to skill upgrading or
to uniformly higher (or lower) unmeasured skills among union than among nonunion
workers. Rather, the principal outcome associated with unionization is lower disper
sion in worker skills in union than in nonunion workplaces. Selection by employers
and employees leads union workers with low credentials or levels of measured skills
to have high unmeasured ability, and those with high credentials or measured skills
to have low unmeasured ability, relative to their nonunion counterparts. In contrast to
standard cross-sectional estimates of union wage effects, our longitudinal estimates
controlling for otherwise unmeasured worker-specific skills differ little with respect
to the level of measured premarket skill.
In the next section we develop the key arguments underlying the analysis. In
Section III, we describe our data and empirical approach, and examine the impact
of sample restrictions on premium estimates. Cross-sectional and longitudinal evi
dence on union wage effects across skill groups is presented in Section IV. In Section
V we examine direct evidence on differences between union and nonunion workers
in aptitude scores.

II. Skill Homogeneity, Unmeasured Skill, and Union
Premium Estimates

We use the term "unmeasured" to refer to worker skills that are
observable to employers and productive in the workplace, but not observable or
measured directly by researchers. Biased estimates of the union premium arise where
unmeasured (omitted) skills are correlated with union status and the wage. Potential
ability bias has led researchers to estimate union wage effects using selectivity meth
ods (for example, Robinson 1989) or longitudinal models that control for unmeasured
worker-specific skills (Mellow 1981; Freeman 1984; Robinson 1989; Jakubson 1991;
Lemieux 1993; Card 1996). The conventional view is that the existence of a union
premium leads to skill upgrading as employers select high-ability workers from the
union queue. As a result, standard premium estimates are biased upward. Economists
surveying the literature on union wage effects have emphasized this point (Lewis
1986, pp. 46-47, 60-61; Hirsch and Addison 1986, pp. 116-17, 127-29; Booth
1995, pp. 171-72). Recently, Wessels (1994) has argued rather convincingly that
the conventional view may be wrong. He shows that a wage premium can decrease,
increase, or leave unchanged worker skills. Given union bargaining power, an em
ployer that upgrades worker skills through selective hiring would then face an even
higher wage in the following bargaining round. Quoting Wessels: "[The standard
story] assumes that unions will sit idly by and let union firms whittle away any union
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wage differential by hiring better-quality workers. I would argue that it is more likely
that unions would respond to better-quality workers by raising wages even more.
Employers, anticipating this, may respond by hiring lower quality workers" (Wes
sels 1994, p. 616). In Wessels' formal model, union employers will hire lower
(higher) skill workers if labor quality augments capital productivity and the elasticity
of substitution between labor and capital is less than (greater than) unity.2
Skill homogeneity in union workplaces can result for (at least) three reasons. First,
homogeneity may result from union wage standardization policies and subsequent
selection by employers and employees. Unions narrow wage differences across high
and low-skill job categories and decrease dispersion within job categories through
reliance on contractually determined wages based on job position and seniority,
rather than on individual, merit-based wage setting (Freeman 1980, 1982). In re
sponse to such wage standardization, employer and employee selection will lead to
unmeasured union-nonunion skills being negatively related to measured skill levels.
To make the point clear, assume unionized firms pay a single wage to all workers
and that schooling represents a premarket attribute measuring worker skill with error.
As workers queue for union jobs, there will be a long queue among less-schooled
workers, for whom the union wage represents a large premium, and a short queue
among highly educated workers, for whom alternative wages tend to be high. Among
the low-schooling group few workers would reject the high-paying union job, but
employers will reject the less-able applicants in the queue. Employer selection, there
fore, leads to high levels of unmeasured skills among those with low credentials.
Among highly educated workers, the most productive workers will not be in the
queue owing to higher alternative wages, leading to low levels of unmeasured ability
among those with high measured skills.3 Selection leads to a predictable bias in
estimates of union wage effects. Estimates from wage level regressions among work
ers with low measured skills are likely to be biased upward owing to positive selec
tion on ability. Estimates among workers with high measured skills are likely to
be biased downward owing to lower unmeasured skill among union than nonunion
workers. The standard conclusion that the union premium is higher for low-skill
than for high-skill workers may be overstated or no longer hold once one nets out
the effects of unmeasured skills.
A second explanation for skill homogeneity emphasizes the effect of dispersion
on the likelihood of unionization, rather than the other way around. Unions are most
likely to organize and maintain political support in establishments where worker
preferences and skills are relatively homogeneous (Farber and Saks 1980; Hirsch
1982; and Demsetz 1993). True skills are likely to be more homogeneous than are
measured skills.
A third explanation for skill homogeneity within union workplaces deemphasizes
union goals and wage standardization and instead focuses on the employer response
to a union tax on wages. As shown by Wessels (1994), depending on the nature of
2. Intuitively, there is little incentive for employers to upgrade skills if it leads to future wage increases
and production technology is such that high-ability workers have a small impact on productivity owing,
for example, to a highly routinized production process.
3. Abowd and Farber (1982) and Card (1996) provide two-sided selection models whereby being a union
member requires a worker to desire covered employment and to be chosen by the employer from the union
queue.
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technology and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, higher union
wages need not lead to skill upgrading. If labor quality augments capital and the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor decreases with measured skill
level (for such evidence, see Hamermesh 1986), the Wessels model predicts a more
compressed distribution of skills in union workplaces. For example, an elasticity of
substitution greater than unity for high school graduates and less than unity for col
lege graduates would lead the firm to hire relatively high ability high school gradu
ates and low ability college graduates in response to a union wage increase.4 Skill
homogeneity can result, therefore, from a uniform union tax on wages, absent any
attempt at wage standardization. As before, union-nonunion differences in unmeas
ured ability decline with the level of measured skill. Although standard wage level
estimates of the premium may decline with respect to measured skill, ' 'true'' union
wage effects would not vary with the level of skill.
All three explanations for union skill homogeneity lead to the expectation of an
inverse relationship between union-nonunion measured and unmeasured skills or,
stated alternatively, greater compression in true skills than in measured skills. The
finding that true union wage effects by skill class are more similar than standard wage
level estimates is consistent, therefore, with any of these explanations. A finding of
identical wage effects across skill groups appears most consistent with a variant of
the Wessels model. A uniform union tax, however, need not be inconsistent with
union contracts that standardize wages and lessen top-to-bottom wage differences
within firms relative to what would exist in a nonunion workplace, as long as em
ployer-employee sorting follows in response to such standardization. But uniform
union wage effects are not consistent with a model in which unions both seek and
acquire larger proportional gains to low-skill than to high-skill members, following
labor market sorting. The union endogeneity explanation (namely, skill homogeneity
increases unionization) may help account for relatively uniform union wage effects,
but does require that union wage effects be equivalent across skill levels.
Card (1996) has recently provided a careful examination of union wage effects
and skills using longitudinal analysis from a 1987-88 CPS panel of male workers.
Following adjustment for misclassification error of union status, based on informa
tion in a January 1977 CPS validation survey, Card concludes that all-worker OLS
wage level and longitudinal union-nonunion wage differential estimates are similar,
and that there exists positive selection among workers with lower measured skill
and negative selection among those with higher measured skill. Card continues to
find that longitudinal union wage effects decline with skill level, although by less
than do standard estimates not controlling for worker fixed effects. Card relies on
a two-sided employer-employee selection model, as described previously, to explain
these results. Our analysis differs from Card in several respects. We utilize substan
tially larger and more recent data-CPS panels for 1989/90-1994/95. Instead of
relying on a measurement error adjustment based on an external survey and assumed
constant across skill grades, we make several sample restrictions that sharply reduce
bias from measurement error and increase reliability of our estimates. In contrast to
4. In the Wessels model, the value given to labor quality depends in part on its enhancement of capital
productivity. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than (less than) unity, a union tax on labor increases
(decreases) capital's share and increases (decreases) the weight given to labor quality.
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Card, we conclude that union wage effects are highly similar across groups of work
ers with high and low levels of measured skills, after accounting for unmeasured
skills and following labor market sorting. We also present direct evidence from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) on union-nonunion differences in
the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT)-a productivity-related worker attribute
not measured in the CPS.5

III. Model, Data, and the Use of Sample Restrictions
to Reduce Measurement Error

The relationship between skills and the union wage premium is ex
amined by estimating log wage equations in levels and in difference form. The former
provides conventional estimates of union premiums by skill category, while the latter
purges premium estimates of bias owing to omitted worker-specific skills transfer
able between union and nonunion jobs. As our measure of skill group, we follow
Card (1996) and sort workers into skill categories based on their predicted wage,
formed by estimating a wage level equation for nonunion workers with premarket
personal and location variables (see footnote 10). All union and nonunion workers
are then placed in one of four quartiles based on the log wage predicted from the
equation.6
Union wage effects are first estimated using standard wage level equations:
(1)

ln W ;rs

=

Xjitsf3js

+

Union;rs8s

+

Yeary;rs'tys

+

r;s + e;,,.

Here ln Wits is the log real wage of worker i in year tin skill groups, vector X consists
of variables (indexed by i) measuring personal and job-related characteristics, and
J3 are the respective coefficients, Union is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker
is a union member, e, is a measure of the union log wage differential by skill group
s, and Year are year dummies (indexed by y). The error term is divided into an
individual-specific "skill" component cris) assumed fixed over time (one year in
our case), and a random, well-behaved component (e;,,).
If the omitted fixed effect r is correlated with union status, then estimates of e
are likely to be biased. For example, let r
a + D.Union + J.L. Using the standard
measure of omitted variable bias (which assumes that r is uncorrelated with other
variables in (1)), the OLS wage premium estimate 8'
e + Q, where e is the
"true" union premium and Q is the skill bias. Further, if the correlation between
Union and Care allowed to differ by skill category s such that e;
e, + Q., the
magnitude and possibly direction of the bias will differ across measured skill catego
ries. Or, as we subsequently show, standard estimates of e; decline with measured
skilled level largely because n, is strongly positive for low-skill workers and small
=

=

=

5. An earlier version of our paper (Hirsch and Schumacher 1996) was written independently of Card's
study. For a related study using Canadian data, see Lemieux (1993).
6. It is important to measure skill based on premarket characteristics rather than on labor market outcomes
(for example, occupational attainment) that are positively correlated with the wage and unmeasured skills.
In an earlier version of our paper (Hirsch and Schumacher 1996), we focused on education as a measure
of skill. As shown subsequently, basic results are highly similar to those based on the predicted wage.
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or negative for high-skill workers. True union wage effects e, may vary little across
measured skill groups.
Letting � represent changes between adjacent years, a wage change equation will
take the form (dropping the individual subscript i):
(2)

� ln Wds

=

AXjds�js

+

� Uniond, es

+

Yeard,'t�,

+

�eds.

Here d indexes the one-year time period over which changes occur and Yeard, repre
sents dummies that measure differences in average wage growth. The fixed effect
r falls out, potentially allowing unbiased estimates of e,.
The data used in the paper are from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing
Rotation Group (ORG) earnings files for January 1989 through May 1995. The struc
ture of the CPS permits one to match given individuals in the same month, one year
apart. We construct a large panel data set for 1989-90 through 1994-95 from the
CPS ORG.7 Our sample consists of private-sector wage and salary workers, ages 16
and over. Excluded are those who are not in private-sector wage and salary employ
ment in consecutive years, workers whose primary activity is schooling in either
year, those whose weekly earnings are top-coded by the Census (at $1,923) in either
year (since measured wage change would then be determined by the earnings assign
ment in the open-ended category), workers with an implied wage (weekly earnings
divided by hours worked per week) less than $1 or more than $99.99 (the latter
corresponds to someone receiving weekly earnings near the cap and working less
than 20 hours), workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement who are not
union members (covered nonmembers are more likely to have union status measured
with error and have wages higher than nonunion workers but lower than union mem
bers), workers whose earnings or union status have been allocated by the Census in
either year (these two restrictions are examined below), and workers who cannot be
matched across years. Because the Census reinterviews households in fixed locations,
individuals whose household moves or who move out of a household during the
year are not in the sample. Young workers are most likely to be underrepresented
(Peracchi and Welch 1995; Card 1996).
To insure comparability between the wage level and wage change samples, the
panel data set is used for estimation of both Equations 1 and 2, with the levels
equations based on second-year observations for each worker. Wage level estimates
using the full CPS ORG data set are very similar. We include standard control vari
ables in X-schooling, potential experience (the minimum of age - schooling
6
or age
16) and its square, gender (separately and interacted with the experience
variables), marital status (two dummies included), race and ethnicity identifiers (4),
part-time status, region (8), metropolitan size (6), industry (12), occupation (11),
and year (5). In the wage change equations, most of the variables in X are time
invariant. Included in addition to changes in union status are changes in experience
squared, part-time status, broad industry, and broad occupation, plus year dummies.
By construction, region and city size do not change because households that move
cannot be matched in the CPS panel. Experience changes by one for all and is cap-

-

7. Details on construction of the CPS panel are provided in Hirsch and Schumacher (1996), along with
separate estimates by gender. The Census adopted new area samples after May 1995, not permitting the
matching of households for June-December 1994-95.
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tured in the intercept. Remaining variables either cannot change by construction of
the panel (for example, gender) or are treated as invariant because recorded changes
may result from measurement error (for example, schooling).
Measurement error in the union variable presents a potentially serious problem
for the longitudinal analysis. Mismeasured union status lowers the signal-to-noise
ratio in /';. Union, biasing estimates of 8 toward 0. We reduce error resulting from
the misclassification of union status through a series of sample restrictions. Although
such restrictions reduce bias from measurement error, they do so at the cost of reduc
ing the sample size and, to a lesser extent, representativeness. Such an approach is
feasible using large CPS panels for multiple years, but is less so using a single year's
CPS panel (as in Card 1996) or smaller data sets such as the PSID or NLSY.
Table 1 presents wage level and longitudinal union premium estimates based on
alternative groups of measured union switchers and using alternative sample restric
tions. Results in lines 1a and lb are based on our primary sample (n
153,778),
using the restrictions stated above. The union premium estimate from the wage level
equation is 0.18 log points. Our most important method for reducing measurement
error bias in /';. Union is to distinguish (using interaction terms) between four types
of reported union changers: workers who change both (three-digit) occupation and
industry as well as union status, those who change industry but not occupation, those
who change occupation but not industry, and those who change neither industry nor
occupation. Our principal results focus on wage changes among the first group
union switchers who also change detailed industry and occupation-because this
group is least likely to include misclassified union switchers. Separate interaction
terms are included to control for the other three groups of union switchers and for
wage change associated with broad occupation and industry change, independent of
union status change.8
Our preferred longitudinal union premium estimate is 0.12 log points, based on the
sample of industry-occupation changers (lines 1a and 2). By contrast, the estimated
premium is 0.08 among workers reporting industry-only changes, 0.03 among occu
pation-only changers, and 0.02 among those changing neither industry nor occupa
tion. These results are consistent with known measurement problems in the CPS,
which exaggerate the amount of year-to-year occupational and, to a lesser extent,
industry switching (Polivka and Rothgeb 1993). A "standard" longitudinal estimate
based on the pooled group of union switchers (line lb) is only 0.06, half the size
of our preferred estimate. Basing longitudinal estimates on union status changers
who also change industry and occupation appears to be a fruitful (and simple) strat
egy for reducing measurement error bias. All longitudinal estimates presented subse
quently are based on union switchers who change occupation and industry.
We next examine alternative sample restrictions. The earliest year in our CPS data
set is 1989, when the Census first included a flag for individuals whose union status
is allocated. Our primary sample (line 2) omits workers whose union status is allo
cated in either of the two years, as well as workers whose earnings are allocated by
=

8. Wage change regressions including not only changes in broad occupation and industry, but also dum
mies for whether workers change detailed industry/occupation, industry only, or occupation only, produced
virtually identical results. In results not shown, wage level estimates of 0 are 0.19 among union members
in year 2 who changed neither industry nor occupation, and 0.15-0.16 among union members who changed
industry or occupation or both.
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Table 1

Wage Level and Change Estimates of the Union Differential, Alternative Sample Restrictions
Wage Level

n

Union

�
("D
......
0

Wage Change
Standard
Error

[#switch]

AUnion

Standard
Error

i
g,

g:

Alternative union switcher groups using primary sample
(.0032)
0.182
153,778
la. Primary sample
Union switchers
Industry Ioccupation change
Industry only change
Occupation only change
No industry/occupation change
0.182
(.0032)
153,778
1b. Primary sample with all union
switchers
Alternative sample restrictions and industry/occupation union switcher estimates
(.0032)
0.182
153,778
2. Primary sample
(.0027)
0.178
217,793
3. Full sample
(.0028)
0.182
213,922
4a. Union not allocated
(.0178)
0.103
3,871
4b. Union allocated
(.0028)
0.180
212,364
5a. Earnings not allocated
0.095
(.0190)
5,429
5b. Earnings allocated
(.0048)
0.186
76,252
6a. No proxy respondent
(.0043)
0.177
77,526
6b. Proxy respondent
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

g

153,778
[6,622]
[1,805]
[638]
[1,684]
[2,495]
[6,622]

0.116
0.082
0.031
0.024
0.056

(.0081)
(.0136)
(.0084)
(.0069)
(.0042)

153,778
217,793
209,792
8,001
207,049
10,744
54,152
99,626

0.116
0.098
0.115
0.008
0.101
0.057
0.115
0.116

(.0081)
(.0068)
(.0073)
(.0253)
(.0069)
(.0338)
(.0149)
(.0098)

The sample includes private-sector wage and salary workers ages 16 and over employed during consecutive years, from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG)
earnings files for January 1989 through May 1995. Deleted are workers not matched across years, workers whose principal activity is schooling, covered nonmembers,
workers with top-coded earnings, and workers with extreme wages or wage changes. The "primary sample" omits workers with allocated union status or allocated
earnings, but includes workers with proxy respondents. Wage level equations are based on 1990-95; wage change equations 1989/90-1994/95. n is sample size and
[# switch] is number of union switchers. In lines 2 through 6, union change coefficients are based on union switchers who change detailed occupation and industty.
Separate interaction terms are included for other union switchers, as in line la. Other variables included in wage level regressions are schooling, potential experience
(minimum of age - schooling - 6 or age - 16) and its square, gender (separately and interacted with the experience variables), marital status (two dummies included),
race and ethnicity identifiers (4), part-time status, region (8), metropolitan size (6), industty (12), occupation (11), and year (5). The wage change equations include, in
addition to the change in union status variables, change in experience squared, change in part-time status, change in industty, change in occupation, and year dummies.

�
"'

�
("D

"'
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the Census in either year.9 The importance of these sample restrictions is seen in
Table 1. The "full" sample (line 3), which includes workers with allocated union
status and earnings, produces a similar premium estimate in levels (0.18), but 0.02
lower in changes (0.10 versus 0.12). Wage level estimates based either on the sample
with union status allocated in the second year of the panel (line 4b) or those with
earnings allocated in year two (line 5b) are each 0.10, substantially lower than the
0.18 from the restricted or full samples. Longitudinal premium estimates are particu
larly sensitive to mismeasured union status and earnings. The sample with union
status allocated in either year (line 4b) has a coefficient on !:. Union of only 0.01,
reflecting serious measurement error bias. The sample with a designation that earn
ings were allocated in either year (line 5b) yields a !:. Union coefficient of only 0.06.
In the latter case, measurement error is in the dependent variable, but 8 is biased
downward because such error is not random. The Census "hot-deck" procedure
often assigns earnings to union workers based on nonunion "donors" and to non
union workers based on union "donors," biasing downward measured union-non
union wage differences.
An additional sample restriction issue examined is whether to include individuals
in the CPS for whom information was provided by a "proxy" respondent (often a
spouse). This issue is potentially important, since roughly half the responses in a
given year are by proxy. Using panel analysis, an even greater proportion of the
sample is based on proxy respondents in at least one of the two years. The good
news is that estimates of union wage effects are highly similar for samples of workers
who provided their own responses and samples with proxy respondents. Lines 6a
and 6b of Table 1 divide our primary sample into ' 'no proxy'' and ' 'proxy'' samples.
Wage level estimates of 8 are 0.19 and 0.18, respectively, while longitudinal esti
mates of 8 are 0.12 in both cases. No distinction between workers with and without
proxy respondents is made in the analysis that follows.

IV. Union-Nonunion Wage Differentials by
Measurable Skill Group

Wage level and change equation estimates of union wage effects by
skill level are provided in Table 2. Column 1 shows estimates of 8 from the full
sample. The next four columns present separate estimates of 8 by skill group, mea
sured alternatively by the predicted wage and schooling. Measured skill quartiles
are formed from a predicted wage based on premarket wage correlates.10 The far
9. Earnings allocation information is not provided in the ORG beginning in 1994. Hence, sample deletions
from the 1993-94 sample are based only on allocation information for 1993, and no deletions are made
from the January-May 1994-95 sample. Card (1996) deletes those with allocated earnings, but was not
able to omit those witb allocated union status.
10. The predicted wage is calculated from the coefficients of a wage equation including schooling, poten
tial experience and its square, gender (separately and interacted with the experience variables), marital
status, race and etbnicity identifiers, region, metropolitan area size, and year, estimated for the sample of
all nonunion workers. Union and nonunion workers are tben divided into skill quartiles measured by their
predicted log wage. Estimates of El, shown in Table 2 are obtained from wage equations estimated sepa
rately by skill group.
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Table 2

:::0

(1)
"'
0
s::

Wage Level and Change Estimates of the Union Differential, by Skill Category

;:J

(1)

Predicted Wage Quartile

Base specification (with occupation dummies)
la. Level (union)
lb. Change (llunion)

Specification (without occupation dummies)
2a. Level (union)
2b. Change (ilunion)
Sample size
Number of union industry/occupation changers
Percent union industryIoccupation to all changers

00

All

First

Second

Third

Fourth

F [p-value]

0.182
(.0032)
0.116
(.0081)

0.223
(.0067)
0.104
(.0143)

0.216
(.0067)
0.113
(.0158)

0.198
(.0057)
0.143
(.0159)

0.130
(.0070)
0.104
(.0195)

91.515
[0 000]
0.001
[0.976]

0.131
(.0033)
0.114
(.0081)

0.203
(.0068)
0.103
(.0144)

0.183
(.0065)
0.109
(.0158)

0.160
(.0058)
0.142
(.0159)

0.043
(.0070)
0.098
(.0195)

258.925
[0.000]
0.036
[0 850]

153,778
1,805
27.3

38,070
504
31.6

38,122
456
28.4

38,631
472
26.7

38,955
373
22.5

.

.

Years Schooling

Base specification (with occupation dummies)
3a. Level (union)
3b. Change (Aunion)

Sample size
Number of union industry/occupation changers
Percent union industry/occupation to all changers

All

Dropouts

High
School

Some
College

College
Graduate

F [p-value]

0.182
(.0032)
0.116
(.0081)

0.237
(.0079)
0.107
(.0191)

0.198
(.0042)
0.117
(.0115)

0.168
(.0063)
0.120
(.0159)

0.084
(.0119)
0.111
(.0269)

113.805
[0.000]
0.022
[0.883]

153,778
1,805
27.3

17,905
303
27.0

63,246
827
28.4

41,384
476
28.1

31,243
199
22.4

See note to Table 1. The predicted wage quartiles are based on coefficients from a log wage equation estimated with the nonunion sample and variables measuring
premarket skills, demographic characteristics, and location (see text for details). The base specification corresponds to that shown in Table 1, line 1. The F and p values
correspond to the null that coefficients in the lowest and highest skill or schooling categories are equivalent. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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right column of Table 2 provides F-ratio and probability values corresponding to
the null that es is equivalent in the low-and high-skill quartiles or schooling groups.
The sample used in Table 2 corresponds to the "primary" sample from Table 1,
with the longitudinal estimates of e based on workers changing industry and occupa
tion as well as union status.11
Cross-sectional union premium estimates decrease substantially with skill leveL
In line 1a, estimates decline with respect to measured skills, with log differentials
of 0.22, 0.22, 0.20, and 0.13 as we move from the lowest to highest skill quartile.
The null of equivalent union premiums in the first and fourth quartiles is decisively
rejected. The cross-sectional pattern is more readily evident when occupation dum
mies are omitted (line 2a), with estimates of 0.20, 0.18, 0.16, and 0.04, respectively.
Absent occupational controls, the wage level model includes relatively few direct
measures of skilL Exclusion of occupation dummies not only lessens differences in
estimated union premiums across skill classes, but also causes the average e to
decrease substantially (from 0.18 to 0.13) because union workers are concentrated
in production and laborer occupational categories with low average pay, while being
underrepresented in professional and managerial occupations. Because wage regres
sions with occupation dummies are standard in the literature, results in line 1a pro
vide the more appropriate benchmark.12 Line 3a segments the sample not by the
predicted wage but by schooling category-dropouts, high school graduates, some
college, and college graduates. This produces a similar pattern with estimates of
0.24, 0.20, 0.17, and 0.08, respectively, for the various schooling classes.
In sharp contrast to wage level estimates of e, longitudinal estimates are highly
similar across skill groups-0.10, 0.11, 0.14, and 0.10 moving across skill groups
from the bottom to top quartiles (line 1b). One cannot reject the null of equality
between the low- and high-skill categories (or, in results not shown, of equivalence
among all skill groups). We obtain identical estimates from the specification without
occupational change variables (line 2b). Using schooling as our measure of skill
group, we obtain estimates of 0.11, 0.12, 0.12, and 0.11 as we move from low to
high schooling (line 3b)Y
Our finding of equivalent longitudinal or ''quality-adjusted'' union premiums
across premarket skill groups differs from results in Card (1996). Card concludes
that fixed-effects estimates, adjusted for union misclassification error, decline with
measured skill, although (as in this study) the spread in union wage effects across
skill groups is reduced substantially as one moves from OLS to a fixed-effects esti
mator. Our results, based on a substantially larger CPS panel data set (1989/901994/95 versus 1987-88), differ from Card's primarily owing to our focus on union
11. An earlier version of the paper (Hirsch and Schumacher 1996) provides separate analysis for males
and females. A similar pattem exists for each group.
12. Card (1996) does not include occupation dummies in his analysis, and thus obtains wage level estimates
similar to his longitudinal premium estimates. Absent control for occupation, we likewise obtain similar
estimates using wage level and wage change analysis. Wage level specifications with less and more detailed
occupational controls yield very similar results. We also examined occupational skill variables from the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles measuring required verbal, numerical and spatial abilities. Following
control for broad occupation, inclusion of DOT skill variables had little effect on union premium estimates.
13. To conserve space, we do not present coefficients from wage change models with separate estimates
for union joiners, union leavers, union stayers, and nonunion stayers. As does Card (1996), we find roughly
symmetrical wage gains and losses for union joiners and leavers.
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switchers who also change industry and occupation. Card's adjustment for measure
ment error assumes a constant rate of misclassification across skill groups.14 Among
all measured union switchers, however, a smaller percentage of high-skill than low
skill workers report changing occupation and industry. For example, 22.5 percent
of union switchers in the top wage quartile change industry and occupation, as com
pared to 31.6 percent in the bottom quartile. If not changing industry and occupation
is a good proxy for the likelihood of misclassification, then applying a common
misclassification rate to all measured union switchers will bias downward estimates
for high-skill relative to low-skill groups.
A clear inference from our results is that unmeasured skills are high among union
workers with low measured skills, and low among union workers with high measured
skills, as compared to nonunion workers with similar measured characteristics.
"True" quality-adjusted union wage effects vary little with respect to measured
premarket skills. The conventional wisdom that union wage effects are substantially
smaller for high-skill workers has little support once one accounts for worker-specific
skills. As discussed earlier, skill homogeneity found in union workplaces is likely
to derive from several sources. A dual selection process, along the lines modeled
by Abowd and Farber (1982) and Card (1996, pp. 977-78) will produce such a
pattern. Given a union premium and the compression of wage differences within
union workplaces, employers hire only the most able among workers with low mea
sured skills, while more able workers with high measured skills are unlikely to be
in the union queue. By this scenario, it is union wage-leveling policies that lead
to a compression in the union ability distribution. An alternative explanation, also
consistent with our evidence, relies on the model provided by Wessels (1994), which
shows that employer response to a uniform union tax on labor may lead to compres
sion in the distribution of worker ability. This explanation for skill homogeneity
emphasizes the role of employers given a uniform union tax, absent union compres
sion of the wage distribution. It is worth emphasizing that the findings here are
conditional on labor market sorting that has taken place in response to unionization.
It does not follow that a randomly selected college graduate would receive as high
a union premium, or a randomly selected high school dropout as low a premium,
as reflected in the longitudinal estimates. These estimates reflect the union premium
observed for given workers switching into or out of union jobs. Such a focus is
appropriate, since we are most interested in union wage effects among actual or
potential covered workers and not among workers who are unlikely to select or be
selected for union employment.

V. Union Status and Skills: Evidence from the NLSY
In this section, we turn to the NLSY for additional evidence on union
status and skills. The AFQT, a widely used measure of individual aptitude, was
administered to the NLSY sample in 1981 (and renormed in 1989), with individuals
14. Card (1996) has large standard errors owing to use of a single CPS panel. He notes that identical
rates of misclassification will produce greater bias among groups with the lowest rate of measured union
transitions.
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Table 3

Mean AFQT Scores and Union-Nonunion AFQT Differentials
Predicted Wage

All

Below
Median

Above
Median

Education
School
:S12

School
>12

Panel A: AFQT mean percentile scores by skill category and union status
Union
40.50
Weighted mean
48.17
29.45
35.10
53.75
Standard deviation
25.80
22.37
25.23
23.49
26.42
765
394
n
231
534
371
Nonunion
51.66
Weighted mean
63.27
34.01
35.99
67.84
25.63
23.56
28.66
23.70
Standard deviation
23.97
2,282
4,112
2,044
2,068
n
1,830
All
Weighted mean
50.09
33.36
61.20
35.83
66.61
Standard deviation
28.54
23.45
26.09
23.66
24.51
2,061
n
4,877
2,438
2,439
2,816
Panel B: WLS regression union-nonunion AFQT differential, by skill class
Union coefficient
-9.230
-1.511
-13.316
-0.422
-9.699
Standard error
1.089
1.243
1.482
1.066
1.726
n
4,877
2,438
2,439
2,816
2,061
AFQT is measured in percentiles. All means and regression results use NLSY sample weights. The pre
dicted wage is determined by coefficients from a log wage equation estimated with the nonunion sample
and variables measuring premarket skills, demographic characteristics, and location (see text for details).
Regressions in Panel B also include dummies for age, gender, race, and ethnicity.

ranging in age from 16 to 24 when tested. The AFQT represents the average of four
tests included in the broader Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, and is
expressed as a percentile score. Our AFQT sample includes 4,877 private-sector
wage and salary workers employed in 1991, ages 26 to 34.
The AFQT measure is useful in at least two ways. First, AFQT scores should be
positively correlated with skills that are unmeasured in the CPS. If our interpretation
of the CPS evidence is correct, then we should observe a decrease in relative union
to-nonunion AFQT scores as we move from workers with low to high skills. Second,
AFQT provides an alternative measure of worker premarket skills. Thus, segmenting
workers on the basis of low and high aptitude scores should produce a pattern of
wage level and wage change union premium estimates similar to those produced
when we segment on the basis of other premarket skills.
Table 3 presents means and regression results measuring union-nonunion differ
ences in the AFQT. Because the NLSY oversamples minorities, all means and regres
sion results are weighted using NLSY sample weights. In order to insure adequate
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sample sizes of union and nonunion workers, we divide the sample into only two
skill groups based, alternatively, on the median of the predicted wage, schooling
(workers with a high school diploma or less and those with at least some college),
and the median of AFQT scores.
The full sample weighted mean of AFQT is the 50.1 percentile. Segmenting on
the predicted wage we obtain a lower-half mean of 33.4 and upper-half mean of
61.2, while we obtain means of 35.8 and 66.6 based on low and high levels of
schooling, respectively. Similar AFQT scores are found among lower-skill union
and nonunion workers (union status is measured by collective bargaining coverage),
with AFQT about 4 points lower among union workers when the division is based
on predicted wages and 1 point lower when based on schooling. In sharp contrast,
among higher-skilled workers (measured by predicted wages or schooling), union
workers score an average 14-15 points lower than do nonunion workers. Panel B
of Table 3 presents the coefficient on union status from weighted least squares (WLS)
regressions with individual AFQT scores as the dependent variableY Union-non
union differences in AFQT are consistent with the means presented above. For the
lower-skill groups of workers, union coefficients are close to 0 and insignificant.
But among those with high predicted wages (schooling), AFQT scores are 13.3 (9.7)
percentile points lower among union than nonunion workers.
Assuming that AFQT is positively correlated with the unmeasured skills con
trolled for in CPS wage change equations, the AFQT evidence supports our hypothe
sis that relative union-nonunion unmeasured skills are inversely related to measured
skills. That being said, AFQT scores do not capture all or even most unmeasured
characteristics valued in the labor market, in particular such attributes as skills ac
quired on the job, worker motivation, and personality.16 The similarity in AFQT
scores among less-skilled union and nonunion workers, coupled with evidence from
this group of a sharp drop in union premium estimates as one moves from wage
level to longitudinal analysis, suggests that there are important worker-specific skills
correlated with union status but measured by neither standard CPS variables nor the
AFQT.
We next provide evidence from the NLSY, analogous to that from the CPS, on
differences in the union premium by skill group. The NLSY has disadvantages rela
tive to the CPS-it includes a limited age range, and sample sizes of union changers
are very small. Hence, we regard evidence from the NLSY as secondary to our
primary evidence from the CPS. The NLSY has advantages, however. First, the
AFQT aptitude score provides an alternative measure of worker-specific premarket
skills, one that is not directly measured in the CPS. Second, the NLSY panel retains
15. Control variables included are dummies for age in 1981 when the test was administered (AFQT scores
increase with age), gender, race, and Hispanic status. Similar union-nonunion differences are found when
the sample is segmented by gender or race.
16. Wage level estimates of the union premium by skill group are affected little by the addition of AFQT
to the wage equation. This suggests that aptitude scores reflect relatively few of the relevant unmeasured
skills in wage level analysis. Cawley et al. (1996) provide evidence that AFQT and other aptitude measures
are more weakly related to earnings and occupational choice than are schooling and family background
measures. Neal and Johnson (1996), however, show that AFQT provides a good measure of black-white
differences in premarket skills (not conditional on schooling or other variables), accounting for much of
the racial wage gap subsequently observed in the labor market.
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workers who have changed households and/or moved geographically. And third,
measurement error in the union change vadable may be reduced by extending the
change period beyond one year (thus increasing the ratio of signal to noise) and by
measuring wage changes among those who change union status and who record
at least one job change during the period. This strategy provides a way to reduce
measurement error in the union change variable without requiring that occupation
and industry also change.
Table 4 presents union coefficients from NLSY wage level and change equations,
with the sample segmented on the basis of predicted wages, schooling, and AFQT.
The NLSY specification follows closely that used in the CPS analysis. The principal
difference, besides the union variable, is that the wage change equations span a
longer time interval (1989-91) and include dummy variables measuring changes in
employer, region, and residence in a metropolitan area. Union status is measured
by collective bargaining coverage, while the change in union status is equal to flUni
on*Chgjob, where Chgjob equals 1 if the individual has changed employers over
the period (separate control variables are included for Chgjob and flUnion*( 1
Chgjob)).
Using the full sample with private-sector earnings in both years (including 130
workers without an AFQT score), the union premium from the levels equation is
0.13, while that from the change equation is 0.08. Although similar qualitatively,
NLSY premium estimates are lower than the full-sample CPS estimates of 0.18 and
0.12 from levels and change equations, respectively. When we segment the sample
based on the predicted wage (the 1-45 and 55-99 percentiles), wage level estimates
are 0.13 and 0.15 for the low- and high-skill groups, while longitudinal estimates
are 0.05 and 0.08, respectively. Standard errors are large, with no differences close
to statistical significance. When the sample is segmented by schooling group, wage
level estimates are 0.18 and 0.02 for the groups with low and high schooling, respec
tively, while the corresponding longitudinal estimates are 0.06 and 0.11.
Finally, we segment workers based on low or high age-adjusted AFQT scores,
measured by the residual from a WLS regression of the AFQT percentile score on
a full set of age dummies.17 Among workers with both low and high AFQT scores,
the wage level premium estimate is 0.15. Longitudinal estimates, however, are 0.07
and 0.17 for the low- and high-ability groups, respectively. The (admittedly impre
cise) NLSY results based on segmentation by predicted wages, schooling, and AFQT
strongly reinforce our conclusions regarding the inverse relationship between relative
union-nonunion measured and unmeasured skills.
-

17. A value of 0 indicates a score equal to the mean of one's age group. The low and high AFQT groups
have scores at least 5 percentile points below and above the mean for their age group, respectively. The
larger sample size for the low AFQT group reflects the NLSY oversampling of minorities and disadvan
taged youth. The AFQT is not directly observable to employers. If AFQT reflects some productivity-related
skills visible to employers, wages will vary accordingly. Hence, wage level and change estimates based
on segmentation by AFQT should be similar to those based on segmentation by predicted wages and
schooling. Hirsch and Schumacher (1996) examine blue-collar/white-collar differences in the union
premium.
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Table 4

Wage Level and Change Estimates of Union Differential, by Predicted Wage,
Schooling, and AFQT Categories
Panel A: Predicted Wage Category
All
Level
Change

0.130
(0.022)
0.077

(0.032)
S ample size
Number of changers

3,775

241

Low
Skill

High
Skill

0.129
(0.030)
0.048
(0.042)

0.154
(0.034)
0.084
(0.054)

1,676
131

1,726
86

F [p-value]

0.288
[0.591)

0.269
[0.604)

Panel B: Schooling Category

Level
Change
S ample size
Number of changers

School

School

All

:S12

>12

F [p-value]

0.130
(0.022)
0.077
(0.032)

0.178
(0.026)
0.060
(0.039)

0.022
(0.041)
0.106
(0.060)

10.426

3,775

2,223

1,552

241

174

67

[0.001]

0.433
[0.511]

Panel C: AFQT Category
All
Level
Change
S ample size
Number of changers

0.125

(0.022)
0.086
(0.033)
3,645
232

Low
AFQT

High
AFQT

0.147
(0.025)

0.146
(0.047)
0.173
(0.073)

0.070

(0.037)
2,052
173

F [p-value]

0.000
[0.989)
1.842
[0. 175]

1,232
43

Shown are coefficients (standard errors) on a union dummy variable in the level equations and the change
in union status in the change equations. The F and p values correspond to the null that coefficients in the
"low" and "high" categories are equivalent. NLSY wage level equations are estimated for 1991, while
change equations measure changes between 1989 and 199 1. All NLSY results are from weighted least
squares regression, using NLSY sample weights. The NLSY sample is composed of workers employed
in the private sector in both 1989 and 1991. The levels specification is highly similar to that used with
the CPS (see Table 1 note and text). In the NLSY change equation, the union status variable is !!.Union
* Chgjob. Additional variables included are changes in union status for those who do not change jobs, a
change job dummy, and changes in experience squared, part-time status, metropolitan residence, region,
industry, and occupation. "Low Skill" and "High Skill" categories in Panel A include workers in this
sample with predicted wages in the 1-45 and 55-99 percentiles, respectively, of the prediction wage
sample. "Low AFQT" and "High AFQT" categories in Panel C include persons with AFQT scores at
least 5 percentile points below or 5 points above the mean for their age group, respectively.

217

2 18

The Journal of Human Resources

VI. Conclusions
A universal finding in the empirical literature is that union wage ef
fects are highest for workers with low levels of measured skills, and lowest among
workers with high measured skills. In contrast to estimates from wage level regres
sions, our longitudinal estimates using CPS panel data are very similar across groups
of workers with different measured levels of premarket skills. The clear inference
is that there exists positive sorting among workers with low measured skills and
negative sorting among those with high measured skills, leading to substantial skill
homogeneity in union workforces. Direct evidence from the NLSY on AFQT scores
confirm that as measured skills increase, aptitude scores decrease for union relative
to nonunion workers. Longitudinal estimates are shown to be sensitive to sample
selection criteria and the designation of ' 'true'' union switchers. Deleting workers
with allocated union status and earnings, and basing union premium estimates on
reported union switchers who also change industry and occupation, provide what
we believe is a reliable strategy to reduce what is otherwise considerable measure
ment error bias in longitudinal premium estimates.
Our analysis does not identify the specific routes through which skill compression
within union workplaces is realized. Skill homogeneity results in part from sorting
that occurs in response to union wage standardization policies that decrease earnings
differences across and within job categories. Employer selection truncates the bottom
tail of the skill distribution, while employee sorting results in there being relatively
few high-skill workers in the union queue. Low dispersion in skills is also likely to
reflect union success in organizing establishments where worker preferences and
skills are relatively similar. A compressed distribution of skills and equivalent union
wage effects across skill levels can also be explained by a variant of a model pro
posed by Wessels (1994), wherein a uniform union tax on wages may lead to an
upgrading of ability among lower-skill workers but not among higher-skill workers.
Our results cast doubt on the thesis that unions both seek and acquire larger propor
tional wage gains for low-skill than for high-skill members. Once labor market sort
ing has occurred, union wage premiums are highly similar for workers with different
levels of skills.
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